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Abstract
We study the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of macroeconomic impulses on
the nominal yield curve. We employ two distinct approaches to identifying
economic shocks in VARs. Our ﬁrst approach uses a structural VAR due
to Galí (1992). Our second strategy identiﬁes fundamental impulses from
alternative empirical measures of economic shocks proposed in the litera-
ture. We ﬁnd that most of the long-run variability of interest rates of all
maturities is driven by macroeconomic impulses. Shocks to preferences for
current consumption consistently induce large, persistent, and statistically
signiﬁcant shifts in the level of the yield curve. In contrast, technology
shocks induce weaker and less robust patterns of interest rate responses,
since they move real rates and expected inﬂation in opposite directions.
Monetary policy shocks are the only macroeconomic shocks with a con-
sistent and signiﬁcant impact on the slope of the yield curve. We ﬁnd
no evidence that ﬁscal policy shocks induce any signiﬁcant interest rate
responses.
∗The paper represents the views of the authors and should not be interpreted as reﬂecting
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction
Vast amounts of information are rapidly assimilated into ﬁnancial market prices.
The Treasury yield curve is often cited as providing information on the current
stance of monetary policy, the adequacy of ﬁscal revenue plans for delivering gov-
ernment services, expectations of future economic activity, real interest rates, and
inﬂation. (For example, see Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Estrella and Hardou-
velis (1991), Blanchard (1985), Mishkin (1990).) To be more speciﬁc, nominal
interest rate movements can be decomposed into real interest rate movements and
changes in expected inﬂation. Changes in real interest rates should be associated
with anything that changes the marginal product of capital, the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution for households, or changes in investors’ risk toler-
ance. Inﬂation expectations should be related to expected monetary policy, which
in turn is associated with macroeconomic aggregates through the central bank’s
policy rule (such as in a Taylor (1993) rule). For these reasons one would expect
to ﬁnd links between movements in the nominal Treasury yields and economic
shocks.
While a major theme of ﬁnance research is to understand the factors that move
the term structure, much recent work on this question assumes that interest rate
changes are driven unobserved ﬁnancial factors, rather than observable macro-
economic factors. (See Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Knez, Litterman and
Scheinkman (1994), and the empirical aﬃne term structure literature described
in Dai and Singleton (2000) and the references therein.) An important exception
is Ang and Piassezi (2001). They introduce two observable macroeconomic fac-
tors into a Dai and Singleton (2000)-type aﬃne model of the yield curve. The
ﬁrst factor is the ﬁrst principal component extracted from several measures of
real economic activity; the second factor is similarly extracted from several price
level indices. They ﬁnd that macro factors explain up to 85% of the long-horizon
variance of one- and 12-month yields; these factors have a much smaller eﬀect on
long yields. Because the macro factors in their model aﬀect primarily the shorter
yields, these factors account for a good deal of the variation in the slope of the
yield curve. However, they ﬁnd little evidence that macroeconomic factors shift
the level of the yield curve.
In this paper, we look at the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of macroeconomic impulses
on the nominal yield curve. We use a variety of vector autoregression approaches
that originated in the work of Sims (1980, 1986), Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and
Watson (1986), among others. We start with an atheoretic empirical exercise that
2simply asks whether the slope, level,a n dcurvature of the yield curve is signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the block of macroeconomic variables. The only restriction we impose
is to assume (following Ang and Piassezi (2001)) that the three yields do not feed
back to the macro variables. We conﬁrm Ang and Piassezi’s (2001) result that a
substantial portion of the variability of short- and medium-term yields is driven by
macroeconomic factors. Unlike those authors, we ﬁnd that most of the long-run
variability of long-term rates is driven by macro impulses, and that the level of
the yield curve responds strongly to macro factors. The strongest responses come
from innovations that induce output and inﬂation responses in the same direction.
We then employ two distinct approaches to identifying economic shocks in
VARs. Our ﬁrst approach uses a structural VAR due to by Galí (1992) that iden-
tiﬁes fundamental macroeconomic impulses as aggregate supply shocks, a real
aggregate demand (IS) shock, and a monetary policy shock. Our second iden-
tiﬁcation strategy is new to the VAR literature. Instead of imposing a priori co-
variance restrictions on the relation between the VAR innovations and shocks, we
infer these relationships from alternative empirical measures of economic shocks
that economists have proposed, often in the context of dynamic general equilib-
rium models. In assuming that we have noisy measures of the true economic
shocks we seek to uncover, we can identify the linear combinations in the VAR
innovations that yield these shocks. Our alternative measures are: Basu, Fernald,
and Shapiro’s (2001a,b) measure of technology shocks; Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans’s (1996) measure of monetary policy shocks; Blanchard and Perotti’s
(2000) measure of ﬁscal policy shocks; and a measure of preference shocks exam-
ined by Hall (1997). We show how this information is easily incorporated into the
standard analysis of VAR impulse response functions.
Our empirical analysis considers two decompositions of yield curve movements.
First, we decompose movements in the level, slope, and curvature of the yield
curve into those due to real interest rate movements and those due to inﬂation.
Secondly, we decompose these movements according to changes in expected future
short rates (the component that would follow the expectations hypothesis) and
movements in term premiums.
We ﬁnd evidence that macroeconomic factors have a substantial, persistent,
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the level of the term structure. This ﬁnding
stands in contrast to Ang and Piazzesi (2001), who ﬁnd that the level of the yield
curve is driven almost exclusively by latent variables orthogonal to their macro
factors. The speciﬁc macro shocks that seem to move the level of the yield curve
most strongly are those that move output and inﬂation in the same direction.
3According to many empirical macroeconomists (e.g., see Blanchard (1989)), this
sort of shock can be thought of as an aggregate demand shock. In the dynamic
stochastic equilibrium literature, a shock to preferences for current consumption
would have a similar eﬀect. Empirically, under a variety of identiﬁcation strategies,
we ﬁnd that an expansionary shock of this type moves expected inﬂation and real
interest rates in the same direction, inducing a large response in the nominal rate.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence that term premiums on long yields also rise, so the
response of long yields is approximately the same as that of short yields. The eﬀect
of technology shocks (or aggregate supply shocks) is more muted. Technology
shocks move real rates and expected inﬂation in opposite directions, attenuating
the eﬀect on the level of the yield curve. In most of our exercises, the response of
expected inﬂation substantially exceeds the response of the real rate, so the yield
level declines (although in only one case is this decline statistically signiﬁcant).
There is little evidence that technology shocks induce signiﬁcant responses in
term premiums. The only shock we ﬁnd that has a signiﬁcant and quantitatively
important eﬀect on the slope of the yield curve is the monetary policy shock. This
response, however, is short-lived, dissipating in 6 months to one year. We ﬁnd
no evidence that interest rates have a quantitatively important response to ﬁscal
policy shocks.
Our approach diﬀers from that of Ang and Piassezi (2001) in three important
ways. First, we follow the literature on monetary policy shocks in allowing our
indicator of monetary policy to feedback on macroeconomic variables in a ﬂexible
manner (as in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Sims (1992), and Christiano, Eichen-
baurm, and Evans (1999)). Second, rather than simply looking at two macroeco-
nomic indicators, we attempt to identify the fundamental economic shocks and to
look at the way these shocks aﬀect interest rates. Third, unlike Ang and Piassezi
(2001) we do not impose no-arbitrage. Ang and Piazzesi (2001) provide evidence
that the out-of-sample forecasting ability of VARs with term structure variables is
enhanced when the no-arbitrage condition is imposed. However, imposition of no-
arbitrage makes it more diﬃcult to compute standard errors for impulse responses
and variance decompositions, which Ang and Piassezi (2001) do not report.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we describe
the basic statistical framework we use. In section 3 we conduct a preliminary
empirical exploration on the eﬀect of macroeconomic factors on the yield curve.
This section revisits some of the questions raised in Ang and Piazzesi (2001). In
section 4, we conduct our ﬁrst exercise aimed at identifying the speciﬁc macroeco-
nomic shocks that move interest rates. In that section, we use an identiﬁcation
4strategy that follows Galí (1992). Section 5 describes an alternative identiﬁca-
tion approach, in which we use measures of macroeconomic shocks derived from
previous literature. We conduct three exercises using these shocks. Section 6
summarizes and discusses the results from all these exercises.
2. Basic statistical framework
We use the following vector autoregression (VAR) framework. Let Zt be an n×1
vector of macroeconomic variables at time t,a n dl e tRt denote an m×1 vector of























where a and d are nonsingular square matrices; c is a rectangular matrix, 0 is the
zero matrix with appropriate dimensions; and A(L),C(L),a n dD(L) are matrix
polynomials in the lag operator L.T h e p r o c e s s [εt,γt]
0 is an i.i.d. vector of
mutually and serially uncorrelated shocks whose variance is the identity matrix.
For most of our exercises we impose restrictions on system (2.1) that identify the
elements of εt as structural macroeconomic shocks. The elements of γt are yield
shocks. The zero restrictions on the upper right-hand blocks of the coeﬃcient
matrices in (2.1) imply that neither the yields Rt nor the yield shocks γt enter the
law of motion for the macroeconomic variables Zt. This restriction is also made by
Ang and Piazzesi (2001). The yield shocks γt are analogous to Ang and Piazzesi’s
(2001) vector of latent ﬁnancial variables.





















0 is the vector of OLS residuals. If the matrix a is known, then the
structural shocks εt can be recovered from the OLS residuals via the relation
ut = aεt (2.3)
To identify the n2 elements of matrix a requires n2 restrictions. Since the variance-
covariance matrix of εt is normalized to be the identity matrix, n(n +1 )/2 re-







≡ Σu = aa
0.
5Therefore, an additional n(n − 1)/2 ap r i o r irestrictions are needed to identify
εt.O n c e εt is identiﬁed, one can compute variance decompositions and impulse
responses in the usual way.
3. Initial empirical exploration
Our ﬁrst exercise is simply an exploration of the data’s properties. The data vector
is given by Z ≡ (Y,P,PCOM,FF)0,w h e r eY denotes the logarithm of industrial
production, P denotes the logarithm of the personal consumption expenditure
chain-weight price index, PCOM denotes the smoothed change in an index of
sensitive materials prices published by the Conference Board, and FF denotes
the Federal funds rate. The yields we use here, and throughout the paper, are the
1-month, 12-month, and 60-month zero coupon bond yields from the CRSP data
base. The data are monthly, beginning in January 1959 through December 2000.
The VAR incorporates 12 lags.
It is convenient expositionally to construct εt and γt in equation (2.1) by posit-
ing a lower-triangular structure for matrices a and d in system (2.1). This is equiv-
alent to a simple recursive orthogonalization of the VAR residuals {ut,v t}.T h e
order of orthogonalization for ut is: {Y,PCOM,P,FF}.W eg i v en os t r u c t u r a l
interpretation to the elements of εt thus constructed, except to interpret them as
linear combinations of the underlying (unobserved) macroeconomic factors.
Our interest here is to revisit the key questions explored by Ang and Piazzesi
(2001): What fraction of yield variance can be accounted for by macro variables,
and can macro variables induce signiﬁcant shifts in the level of the yield curve?
Results for the ﬁrst question are in Table 1, which displays the fraction of the
conditional variance of each yield (at three time horizons) attributable to each of
the orthogonalized residuals. While only 22% of the one-month-ahead conditional
variance of the shortest yield is accounted for by macro variables (most of this is
due to Federal Funds rate orthogonalized innovations), fully 86% of the 60-month
ahead variance of this yield is attributable to macro factors. Most of this is due to
the orthogonalized innovations other than the Federal Funds rate. Similarly, the
fraction of the one-month ahead conditional variance for the 12- and 60-month
yields explained by macro factors are only 17.5% and 10.8%, respectively. When
we look at the 60-month ahead variance, these percentages rise to 84% and 86%
for these two bonds. Again, for these longer yields most of the variance at the
60-month horizon is explained by the ﬁrst three macro impulses, rather than the
Federal Funds rate orthogonalized innovation.
6Our estimates of the fraction of 60-month ahead variance explained by macro
factors for the one- and 12-month yields are similar to those reported by Piazzesi
and Ang (2001). However, our estimates of this statistic for the 60-month yield
is much higher than that reported by Piazzesi and Ang (2001). They report
that only 48% of the 60-month ahead variance of the long bond is explained by
macroeconomic factors.
We now ask whether macro shocks shift the level of the yield curve as well as the
slope and curvature. To do so, we must give precise deﬁnitions for level, slope and
curvature. Ang and Piazzesi (2001) associate the level of the yield curve with an
equally weighted average of the 1-month, 12-month, and 60-month yields. Their
m e a s u r eo ft h es l o p ei st h ed i ﬀe r e n c eb e t w e e nt h e6 0 - m o n t hy i e l da n dt h e1 - m o n t h
yield, and their measure of curvature is the sum of the 1-month and 60-month
yields minus twice the 12-month yield. We use a slightly diﬀerent characterization.
We follow Cochrane (2001) and take the three principal components of the 1-
month, 12-month, and 60-month yields at each date. We associate the level
of the yield curve with the ﬁrst principal component, the slope with the second
principal component, and the curvature with the third component. The weights
for this principal component decomposition are displayed in Table 2. Notice that
the weights are close to those used by Ang and Piazzesi (2001). In particular,
the level weights are approximately equal, the slope weights on the 1-month and
60-month yields are approximately the same magnitude but opposite signs, with
the slope weight on the 12-month yield close to zero, and the curvature weight
on the 12-month yield is larger and opposite in sign from the curvature weights
on the other two yields. Our measures of level, slope, and curvature have the
advantage that they represent an orthogonal decomposition of the vector time
series of yields. In practice, our measures of level, slope, and curvature display
very similar behavior to the measures used by Ang and Piazzesi (2001).
In Figure 1, we plot the responses of the three yields (rows 1 - 3 in the ﬁgure),
as well as the responses of level, slope, and curvature (rows 4 - 6), to the pos-
itive orthogonalized innovations in our four macro variables. The dashed lines
give upper and lower two-standard error bands, computed using 200 Monte Carlo
simulations with bootstrapped residuals. Note that the orthogonalized residuals
to Industrial Production and to the commodity price index (columns 1 and 2 of
the ﬁgure) shift all three yields upwards. These responses are large: the maximal
responses of the 1-, 12-, and 60-month yields to a one-standard deviation shock
to the IP orthogonalized residual are 24, 22, and 16 basis points, respectively; the
corresponding maximal responses of these yields to the PCOM residual are 29, 30,
7and 24 basis points, respectively. Because the yields respond roughly in parallel,
the yield level shifts upwards, but the yield slope and yield curvature responses
are small and (mostly) insigniﬁcant.1 The level responses are highly signiﬁcant
and very persistent.
The yield responses to the orthogonalized innovation to the price level are
small and insigniﬁcant. The fed funds orthogonalized innovation moves the short
yield substantially, with a progressively smaller response as the yield maturity
lengthens. As a result, the primary eﬀect of this shock is to shift the slope of the
yield curve. Since the level is (approximately) an equally-weighted average of the
three yields, the yield level also moves up, but by a smaller amount.
Our ﬁnding of substantial level responses to macro shocks contrasts with Ang
and Piazzesi’s (2001) results. They found that macro factors induced a substan-
tial response in the yield curve slope, but they concluded that level shifts were
primarily driven by latent ﬁnancial factors. In our system, macroeconomic factors
have a much larger impact on the long yield. Our conjecture is that the key
diﬀerences between the two approaches is that we allow for propagation of macro
shocks through the monetary transmission mechanism.
To summarize, our ﬁrst exercise indicates that a large fraction of the long-run
variability of interest rates across all maturities is accounted for by macroeconomic
impulses. There are combinations of macroeconomic innovations that have large,
signiﬁcant, and long-lived impacts on the level of the yield curve. The innovations
with the largest nominal yield eﬀects are associated with simultaneous increases in
industrial production and inﬂation. However, unless substantially more structure
is imposed on the VAR innovations, this description of the data’s conditional sec-
ond moment properties represents an incomplete characterization of the economic
determinants of the nominal yield curve. In the following sections, we impose
more economic structure to make inferences about these economic determinants.
4. Identiﬁcation from a structural VAR
The principal economic driving processes in recently-studied dynamic general equi-
librium models are technology shocks, monetary policy shocks, government spend-
ing and tax shocks, and shocks to preferences for current consumption services.
Much of the structural VAR literature to date has focused each individual analysis
on identifying a single shock. For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
1Throughout this paper, we refer to an impulse response as “signiﬁcant” over a particular
interval if the two-standard error bands exclude zero. bxtc
8(1999) study monetary policy shocks, Galí (1999) studies technology shocks, and
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Blanchard and Perotti (2000) study ﬁscal policy
shocks. Galí (1992), however, is an important structural VAR paper that rig-
orously analyzes a large number of driving shocks.2 Galí’s (1992) identiﬁcation
strategy imposes a mixture of long-run restrictions and contemporaneous impact
restrictions to identify four economic shocks. Galí’s four shocks are a long-run
aggregate supply shock (which we interpret as a technology shock); a transitory
IS shock which aﬀects aggregate demand; a monetary policy shock; and a residual
shock that Galí interpreted as a money demand shock (but we interpret as a tran-
sitory supply shock). In this section, we study the implications of Galí’s identiﬁed
economic shocks for the nominal yield curve. In section 5, we study model-based
measures of these shocks to conﬁrm the empirical ﬁndings here.
4.1. Galí’s identifying restrictions
We follow Galí in considering a four-variable autoregression for the macro system.
The data vector is given by Z ≡ (∆Y,FF,FF − ∆P,∆M − ∆P)0,w h e r e :∆Y
denotes the log diﬀerence in industrial production, FF denotes the Federal funds
rate, FF − ∆P denotes the real interest rate (where ∆P is the log diﬀerence
in the CPI), and ∆M − ∆P denotes real M1 balances. The data are monthly,
beginning in January 1959 through December 2000. Identiﬁcation is achieved with
six restrictions on the covariance structure of the innovations. First, the monetary
policy, transitory supply, and IS shocks have no long-run eﬀect on output; these
restrictions identify the long-run supply shock. Second, the monetary policy and
transitory supply shocks have no contemporaneous eﬀect on output; knowledge of
the long-run supply shock and these two restrictions identify the IS shock. Third,
one additional identifying restriction is necessary to identify the remaining two
shocks. An additional restriction that Galí considers simply deletes the price data
from the monetary authority’s contemporaneous information set. This identiﬁes
the monetary policy shock directly, and the remaining shock is determined.
4.2. Empirical results from Galí’s identiﬁcation
Impulse responses implied by the Galí model, with two-standard error bootstrap
bands, are displayed in Figure 2. The ﬁrst 3 rows of the ﬁgure give responses
2Other important articles with many shocks include the original structural VAR contributions
by Bernanke (1986), Blanchard and Watson (1986) and Sims (1986).
9to the long run supply shock, the next 3 give responses to the aggregate demand
(IS) shock, rows seven through nine give responses to the monetary policy (MP)
shock, and the ﬁnal 3 rows give the responses to the transitory supply shock. For
each shock, we display responses of the macroeconomic variables (column one and
the ﬁrst graph in column three); the three yields (in column 2); and the level and
slope of the term structure computed using weights in Table 2 as in section 3 (ﬁrst
graphs in columns 4 and 5). In addition, in the remaining graphs in columns 4
and 5, we plot the “inﬂation level”, “inﬂation slope”, “real rate level”, and the
“real rate slope”. The former two weight the responses of one-month-, 12-month-
, and 60-month-ahead inﬂation by the same eigenvector elements, displayed in
the ﬁrst two rows of Table 2, that we used to construct the yield level and yield
slope, respectively. The real rate level is the yield level minus the inﬂation level,
and the real rate slope is the yield slope minus the inﬂation slope. These four
plots thus decompose movements in the yield level and slope into the component
due to the response of one-month, 12-month, and 60-month real rates and the
component due to expected inﬂation.3 Finally, the last two graphs of column 3
display the responses of the 12-month and 60-month term premiums. These are
the responses of the 12- and 60-month yields in excess of that predicted by the
expectations hypothesis.4
Consider ﬁrst the response of the macroeconomic variables to the four identiﬁed
shocks. The directions of these responses can be reconciled with many implica-
tions from business cycle models. Following Blanchard (1989), an expansionary
long-run supply shock induces opposite movements in output and the price level.
It also induces a persistent rise in real interest rates, which is consistent with a
shock that increases the marginal product of capital. The systematic response of
monetary policy to the long-run supply shock reduces the federal funds rate. This
response seems consistent with the implications of a simple Taylor (1993) rule:
a positive aggregate supply shock expands productive capacity, so the increased
output does not reﬂect an increase in the output gap while at the same time in-
ﬂation falls. In contrast, a positive aggregate demand (IS) shock increases both
3To conserve space we do not display the term structure curvature or its components. The
reason is that, with our principal components decomposition, the term structure curvature is
the residual after level and slope are removed. The response of this residual to macroeconomic
shocks is small and insigniﬁcant in almost all the experiments we conduct.
4These term premium responses are computed as the yield response for the 12- and 60-month
yields, minus the cumulated response of the one-month yield over 12 and 60 months in the future,
respectively. These cumulated one-month responses give the responses of the longer yields that
would be seen if the expectations hypothesis held.
10output and prices, so the systematic response of monetary policy is to tighten the
funds rate. The responses following a monetary policy shock are similar to others
found in the monetary policy response literature (see Christiano, Eichenbaum,
Evans (1998) and Evans and Marshall (1998)): a monetary contraction reduces
output and inﬂation while increasing the real rate.
Let us turn now to the response of nominal interest rates to these four shocks.
The aggregate demand shock induces the largest yield responses, in terms both of
the magnitudes of the responses and their statistical signiﬁcance. The three yields
increase between 15 and 25 basis points following a one-standard deviation positive
aggregate demand shock, and these responses are long-lived, remaining signiﬁcant
over four years after the initial impulse. In contrast, the responses of yields to the
long run aggregate supply shock are not statistically signiﬁcant. While the point
estimates are comparable to those induced by the aggregate demand shock, the
responses are not statistically signiﬁcant, since the zero line falls within the two-
standard error bounds. The responses of yields to the monetary policy shock are
similar to those found in Evans and Marshall (1998): A one-standard deviation
contractionary monetary policy shock induces a positive but short-lived response
in the shortest yields, with the magnitude of the response decreasing smoothly
with maturity. The responses of interest rates to the fourth shock are small and
insigniﬁcant.
Since the aggregate demand shock appears most important for interest rate
movements, let us look more closely at the way this impulse aﬀects the yield curve.
The yields of all maturities respond similarly, so the aggregate demand shock
raises the level of the yield curve without a signiﬁcant change in the slope. The
reason for this pronounced response of the yield curve level is that the aggregate
demand shock shifts inﬂation and real rates in the same direction. The inﬂation
level response is initially quite positive and signiﬁc a n t ,r i s i n gt o1 9b a s i sp o i n t s
at the third month following a positive impulse. As it decays thereafter, the real
rate responds with a delay, peaking at 10 basis points in the fourth month and
declining gradually. These two components reinforce each other, resulting in the
signiﬁcant yield level response. In contrast, the aggregate supply shock moves
the real rate level and the inﬂation level in opposite directions. The only reason
why the point estimates remain fairly large is that the inﬂation level response is
quantitatively much more important than the real rate level response.
The response of the yield slope to both the aggregate demand and long run
aggregate supply shocks, as well as the responses of the real rate and inﬂation
components of the slope, are small and insigniﬁcant. The only shock that induces
11a substantial change in the yield slope is the monetary policy shock, although
this response is short-lived. While the eﬀect of the monetary policy shock on
the real-rate and inﬂation slopes are in opposite directions, the real-rate eﬀect is
so much stronger that it induces a shift in the slope of the nominal yield curve.
In particular, short-term real rates increase by over 50 basis points, with much
smaller eﬀects on the two longer real rates. This induces a profound ﬂattening
i nt h er e a lr a t es l o p e .
The small and insigniﬁcant slope response to the aggregate demand shock,
and the persistence of the response of longer-term interest rates to this shock,
are due in part to another factor: the signiﬁcant and persistent response of term
premiums The expectations hypothesis, as characterized by Campbell and Shiller
(1991), holds that term premiums are time-invariant. It is well-known that the
expectations hypothesis fails to hold in post-war U.S. data. However, it is of
interest to consider whether it holds conditional on a particular macroeconomic
shock. That is, does the expectations hypothesis fail regardless of the shock that
moves expected short rates, or is the failure of this hypothesis only in response
to particular shocks? In rows 5 and 6 of column 3, we plot the response of the
12-month and 60-month term premiums to a positive aggregate demand shock.
While these responses initially are insigniﬁcant, they become signiﬁcant at about 5
basis points about 18 months after the impulse, remaining signiﬁcant through the
remaining 4-year horizon. While the magnitude of these term premium responses
are small, they induce suﬃcient additional movement in the longer yields to keep
the response of the term slope ﬂat. If these term premium responses were set to
zero, the slope of the term structure would fall signiﬁcantly over the four years
following a positive aggregate demand shock, and much of the movement in the
yield curve would be attributed to the slope, rather than the level. Note in Figure
2 that no other shock induces a signiﬁcant response in the 12- and 60-month term
premiums. In the context of the Galí model, one could conclude that the failure of
the expectations hypothesis is due principally, and perhaps exclusively, to shocks
to aggregate demand.5
5Another possibility is that the systematic response of monetary policy is diﬀerent conditional
o nt h er e a l i z a t i o no fa na g g r e g a t ed e m a n ds h o c kc o m p a r e dw i t ho t h e rs h o c k s . I ft h e s ep o l i c y
actions inject a wedge into ﬁnancial intermediation technologies, economy-wide risk-sharing
could fall and risk premiums rise. We defer this to future research.
125. Identiﬁcation from model-based shock measures
In the previous section, the Galí model placed strong ap r i o r irestrictions on the
covariance structure of the VAR innovations to achieve identiﬁcation. With a
suﬃcient set of restrictions, identifying the economic shocks is always feasible if
the space spanned by the VAR innovations is equivalent to the space spanned
by the economic shocks. However, most lists of identifying restrictions in VARs
are only roughly motivated by economic theory and are typically controversial.
In this section, we introduce a diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategy with two novel
features. First, the identifying restrictions are closely tied to speciﬁce c o n o m i c
theories. In particular, as in Prescott (1986) and Hall (1997), we exploit the
ability of economic models to guide directly in the construction of noisy measures
of the economic shocks. Second, few prior restrictions are placed on the covariance
structure of the VAR innovations. As much as possible, we allow the model-based
measures to dictate the VAR identiﬁcation. To this end, we now describe our
model-based measures of economic shocks and then provide three methods for
computing impulse responses for the macroeconomic variables and interest rates.
5.1. Model-based measures of economic shocks
Our model-based measures of technology, preference, monetary and ﬁscal policy
shocks relies heavily on research on fundamental shocks from antecedent articles.
We derive shocks to preferences using an approach proposed by Hall (1997); we
use a time-series for technology shocks estimated by Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro
(2001a,b); we use a time series for ﬁscal policy shocks estimated by Blanchard
and Perotti (2000); and we use shocks to monetary policy derived by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996).6 We will use the notation ηmrs, ηtech, ηfiscal
and ηmp for the model-based shocks to preferences, technology, ﬁscal policy, and
monetary policy, respectively.
6The alert reader will notice that since the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and
Blanchard and Perotti (2001) shocks are derived from VARs, we are abusing somewhat the term
“model-based shocks.” Nevertheless, we persist in using this terminology to maintain a clear
distinction between the methods in this section versus previous structural VAR analyses.
135.1.1. Technology shocks
One-sector, dynamic general equilibrium models with full competition frequently
specify a constant returns to scale technology
Yt = zt F(vtKt,e tNt)
lnzt = µ +l nzt−1 + εzt (5.1)
where Y , z, v, K, e,a n dN are the levels of output, technology, capital utiliza-
tion rate, capital stock, labor eﬀort, and labor hours. Standard Solow growth
accounting implies that the technology innovation εzt can be measured as
∆lnzt = εzt + µ
= ∆lnYt − θt (∆lnvt + ∆lnKt) − (1 − θt)(∆lnet + ∆lnNt).
There is a large empirical macroeconomic literature on measuring exogenous tech-
nological innovations that controls for endogenous features in measured Solow
residuals. (For example, see Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993) and Braun
and Evans (1998)). For our measure of the technology shock ηtech,w eu s eaq u a r -
terly, aggregate measure of technology from Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001a,b)
which is based upon a constant returns to scale technology.7 Their measure con-
trols for variable capital utilization rates, unobserved eﬀort, and adjustment costs
in investment. The data begin in 1965:II and end in 2000:IV. If speciﬁcation (5.1)
is correct and the variables are measured without error, then ηtech = εz. However,
if the technology is misspeciﬁed, latent production factors are omitted, or the data
measures do not match the theory, then ηtech will be a noisy measure of εz.
5.1.2. Preference shocks
Preference shocks have the potential to shift aggregate demand for goods and
services. Hall (1997), Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Baxter and King (1991)
ﬁnd substantial business cycle eﬀects from empirical measures of intratemporal
marginal rates of substitution between consumption and labor (henceforth, “MRS
shock”). The following approach generalizes Hall’s (1997) procedure to allow
for time-nonseparable preferences. Consider a representative consumer with the









7We thank John Fernald for providing us with this time series on technology shocks.
14lnξt = ρ(L)lnξt−1 + εmrs,t (5.2)
where C is consumption of the representative agent, C represents the per-capita
aggregate consumption level, N is labor hours, ξ is a serially correlated preference
shifter, and εmrs is a serially independent shock. The ﬁrst-order conditions for










where Wt is the real wage. Taking logs yields





In equilibrium, the per-capita aggregate consumption equals the consumption
levels of the representative agent, so C = C.
This expression leads to an observable measure of ξt. Our data are quarterly
and extend from 1964:I to 2000:IV. Consumption is measured by per capita non-
durables and services expenditures in chain-weighted 1996 dollars. Labor hours
correspond to hours worked in the business sector per capita. The real wage cor-
responds to nominal compensation per labor hour worked in the business sector
deﬂated by the personal consumption expenditure chain price index. The hours
and compensation data are reported in the BLS productivity release. The utility
function parameters are taken from previous studies. First, we set γ =1 . This cor-
responds to log utility for consumption services, which is a standard speciﬁcation.
Second, we use Hall’s (1997) value for φ =1 .7, corresponding to a compensated
elasticity of labor supply of 0.6. Finally, we set the habit persistence parameter
b =0 .73 as estimated by Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2000).
We measure ηmrs as the residual in equation (5.2). We estimate a sixth-order
polynomial for ρ(L) and we allow for measurement errors in the consumption, real
wage and labor hours data. In addition, the MRS measure ξt exhibits noticeable
low frequency variation, so we also extract a linear time trend to account for
demographic factors that are beyond the scope of this analysis. We estimate ρ(L)
and the trend term using instrumental variables.8 If there were no measurement
errors and the estimated parameters were equal the true parameters, then ηmrs =
8Our shock identiﬁcation strategy assumes that the measurement errors in our model-based
shocks are independent of the VAR innovations. Consequently, we use real GDP, the GDP price
index and commodity prices as instruments.
15εmrs. If the relationships above are misspeciﬁed or the data measures do not
match the theoretical variables, then ηmrs will be a noisy measure of εmrs.
5.1.3. Monetary Policy Shocks
The empirical literature on monetary policy reaction functions suggests a number
of identiﬁcations for monetary policy shocks (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1999). In this study, we use as our ηmp measure an updated version of
the monetary policy shock in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996). The
variables in the VAR are the logarithm of real GDP, the logarithm of the GDP
chain-weighted price index, the smoothed change in an index of sensitive materials
prices published by the Conference Board, the Federal funds rate, the logarithm
of nonborrowed reserves and the logarithm of total reserves. The data run from
1959:I through 2000:IV.
5.1.4. Fiscal Policy Shocks
The recent literature on ﬁscal policy shocks has oﬀered a number of promising
identiﬁcations (see Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher
(1999), and Blanchard and Perotti (2000)). We use a time series for ﬁscal shocks
derived by Blanchard and Perotti (2000)).9 These authors start with a three-
variable VAR in GDP, government spending, and tax receipts. The latter two
variables incorporate federal, state, and local measurements. Also, taxes are mea-
sured net of transfers, so the spending measure does not include transfers. Blan-
chard and Perotti then subtract oﬀ automatic responses of spending and taxes to
shocks to GDP, and impose additional restrictions to identify exogenous shocks to
taxes and government spending.10 We construct our overall ﬁscal shock ηfiscal as
a shock to the government deﬁcit, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the govern-
ment spending shock and the tax shock. We use the shock measures that assume
a deterministic trend. We have also performed the analysis with the individual
tax and spending shocks. The results are qualitatively unchanged.
9We thank Roberto Perotti for providing us with his time series of ﬁscal policy shocks.
10Blanchard and Perotti (2001) estimate their VAR under two diﬀerent trend assumptions.
First, they incorporate deterministic time trends; second, they allow for stochastic trends. We
have done our analysis with ﬁscal shocks computed both ways. The results are very similar, so
we only display the results for the model with deterministic time trends.
165.2. Responses to individual model-based shocks
Given a time series of a model-based shock, one method for computing impulse
responses is simply to include the shock as another variable in the VAR and
ordering its innovation ﬁrst in a recursive scheme. Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (1999) use this approach to extract monetary policy shocks from Federal
funds futures data. For each shock in our analysis, we compute an 8-variable
using the following quarterly variables: one of the 4 model-based shocks; four
macroeconomic variables including GDP, the GDP price deﬂator, the commodity
price index PCOM measured at a quarterly frequency, and the federal funds
rate. As before, we also include the one-, 12-, and 60-month zero coupon bond
yields and we incorporate one year’s worth of lags. The structure is analogous to
equation (2.1), except that one of the four model-based shocks in turn is included
as an 8th variable in the VAR. We orthogonalize the residuals using a recursive
ordering, with the model-based shock ordered ﬁrst. This is equivalent to treating
the VAR residual for the shock equation as the structural impulse.
Before describing the results, two caveats should be mentioned. First, although
the VAR literature typically assumes that the fundamental shocks have a diagonal
variance-covariance structure, economic theories generally provide no deep expla-
nation for the assumed correlation structure among model-based shocks. The
correlation matrix of our model-based shocks is displayed in Table 3. Note that




,w h i c h
exceeds 0.30 In considering each model-based shock individually in our analysis
here, the eﬀects of correlated shocks may be blurred together. In section 5.3 below,
we describe two alternative procedures that can accommodate correlation among
our noisy shock measures. Second, by introducing four additional variables into
the macro VAR, we are assuming that there are four additional sources of exoge-
nous macroeconomic variation. Our two alternative approaches below attempt to
reduce the unknown sources of variation by identifying ηt directly with εt.
Turning to our empirical results in Figure 3, the design of this ﬁgure is analo-
gous to Figure 2, except that, as described above, the responses to each individual
shock are derived from diﬀerent 8-variable VARs. Interestingly, the results are
quite similar to those obtained from our Galí model in section 4. The two model-
based shocks that would be most closely associated with the Galí IS aggregate
demand shock would be the MRS shock and the ﬁscal policy shock. The MRS
shock acts similarly to the aggregate demand shock in section 4, in that it induces
a positive response in output, inﬂation, and the real interest rate (although the in-
ﬂation response is insigniﬁcant). Of all four model-based shocks, the MRS shock
17is the only one that induces a large, signiﬁcant, and fairly long-lived response in all
three yields. The responses of the one- and 12-month yields are similar, peaking
at around 50 basis points in the third quarter following the shock. The response
of the 60-month yield has a similar shape but is somewhat smaller in magnitude.
These responses imply a signiﬁcant and substantial shift upward in the level of
the yield curve that lasts about two years. The main reason for this level shift
is a pronounced increase in the real interest rate level. This is consistent with
our interpretation of this shock as a transitory shock to the marginal utility of
consumption. Furthermore, the large response of the yield level is due in no small
part to a large and signiﬁcant response of the term premiums. Notice that these
term premium responses peak 3 quarters after the impulse. These peaks are mir-
rored in the responses of the yields themselves, and the term premium responses
account for about one-half of the total response of these longer yields. Because
the shorter rates initially increase more than the 5-year rate, the yield slope ﬂat-
tens signiﬁcantly for the ﬁrst two quarters. This ﬂattening of the yield curve
would last about two years were it not for the response of the term premiums,
which oﬀset the ﬂattening of the yield curve by pushing longer rates up.
In contrast to this pronounced interest-rate response to the MRS shock, we
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant responses of interest rates to either the technology shock or
the ﬁscal policy shock. The point estimates of the yield responses to the ﬁscal
policy shock are uniformly small and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This
is somewhat surprising given the results from the model of section 4, since one
would normally think of ﬁscal policy as an important driver of aggregate demand.
Taking these results at face value, one would conclude that the aggregate demand
eﬀects in section 4 are not primarily driven by exogenous ﬁscal policy shocks.
H o w e v e r ,t h es y s t e m a t i cr e s p o n s eo fm o n e t a r ya n dﬁscal policy to technology
and preference shocks could still aﬀect the term structure. Tracing out these
systematic components is well beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, the model-based monetary policy shock induces responses very similar
to the monetary policy shock of section 4: a contractionary shock depresses output,
reduces inﬂation (although insigniﬁcantly), increases real rates, induces a short-
lived increase in the yield level and decrease (ﬂattening) of the yield slope. Unlike
the model of section 4, the model-based monetary policy shock does induce a
statistically signiﬁcant increase in term premiums about a year after the initial
impulse.
185.3. Using model-based shocks to identify a structural VAR.
While the results above are suggestive, they are diﬃcult to compare across shocks
because the model-based shock measures are not orthogonal. Our alternative
model-based shock identiﬁcation assumes that the true economic shocks εt are
linear combinations of the VAR residuals ut,a n dt h a tt h em o d e l - b a s e ds h o c k sηt
represent noisy measures of these true shocks. Speciﬁcally, rewrite equation (2.3)
by deﬁning A ≡ a−1,s o
Au t = εt (5.3)
with Σu and I being the (n × n) variance-covariance matrices of ut and εt, respec-
tively. We assume that the (n × 1) vector of model-based shocks ηt is related to
t h ee c o n o m i cs h o c k sεt by
ηt = D εt + wt (5.4)
where D is a non-singular (n × n) matrix and wt is a vector of measurement errors
independent of εt.
Identiﬁcation comes down to uniquely determining the matrices A and D given
the population moments from the VAR innovations ut and noisy measures ηt.









This condition is important: since Σuη can readily be computed from the data, A
could be identiﬁed with no a priori restrictions if D were known. In eﬀect, this
shifts identifying restrictions from matrix A to matrix D. Arguably, restrictions
on D are easier to justify than restrictions on A, since the former maps underlying
structural shocks into their empirical counterparts, while the latter maps the
underlying shocks to the VAR residuals.
To estimate D, the standard VAR identiﬁcation condition,
AΣuA
0 = I (5.6)






uη D = I (5.7)
As in the typical identiﬁed VAR, n(n − 1)/2 ap r i o r iidentifying restrictions on
D are required. Some η measures may be linear combinations of the under-
lying shocks, perhaps due to mismeasurement in the way the series in η were
19computed.11 Alternatively, in the situation where each element of η is a direct
measure of ε,t h e nD would be diagonal and the system would be overidenti-
ﬁed. Whenever the system is overidentiﬁed, equation (5.7) will not hold exactly
in ﬁnite samples. Nevertheless, one can still compute D by using the maximum
likelihood procedure described in Hamilton (1994, pp.331-332). Matrix A can
then be computed using equation (5.5) However, the resulting A matrix will not
factor Σu since equation (5.7) does not hold exactly. We refer to this case as the
overidentiﬁed system.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ee x a c t l yn(n − 1)/2 restrictions on D are imposed, the sys-
tem is exactly identiﬁed, and a unique A matrix exists satisfying equations (5.6)
and (5.7). We restrict our attention to exactly identiﬁed systems where D is
lower triangular. In this case, the A matrix can be computed directly as follows.
Substitute equation (5.3) into equation (5.4) to get
ηt = Cut + wt (5.8)
where
C ≡ DA. (5.9)
Since wt is uncorrelated with εt, it is also uncorrelated with ut,s ot h em a t r i x
C can be estimated from equation (5.8) by ordinary least squares. Given our




We can then compute D as the unique lower triangular factorization of CΣuC0.
Matrix A is then computed as A = D−1C.
As equation (5.8) shows, the model-based shocks only provide useful infor-
mation for identifying A if they are correlated with the VAR residuals ut.T a -
ble 4 provides evidence on these correlations for the data we use. It displays
the R2sf o rt h eOLS regressions in system (5.8) using the measures of ηt = ³
ηmp,ηmrs,ηtech,ηfiscal
´0
described in section 5.1. As in section 5.2, we use four
macroeconomic variables in the VAR: GDP, the GDP price deﬂator, the com-
modity price index PCOM, and the federal funds rate. The only model-based
shock that looks problematic from this perspective is the ﬁscal shock, whose R2
11For example, if standard measures of Solow residuals are not purged of labor hoarding
components, then they will be contaminated with other shock measures as well. Evans (1992)
found evidence of such contamination in Prescott’s (1986) measure.
20is only 8.7%.12 This suggests that our ﬁscal shock measure ηfisc may not provide
strong identiﬁcation for an underlying ﬁscal shock in the context of our VAR sys-
tem. As a result, we exercise caution in interpreting the responses to the ﬁscal
shock implied by this exercise.
5.4. Empirical results using model-based shocks in an over-identiﬁed
system
The most straightforward assumption linking the model-based shocks to the true
underlying shocks is to assume that each element of ηt equals the corresponding
element of εt plus measurement error. In this case, D is diagonal, the system
is overidentiﬁed, and A−1A
0−1 6= Σu in ﬁnite samples. In practice, this latter
fact leads to the counterfactual implication that more than 100 percent of the
variation in output and other variables is accounted for by the economic shocks.
In the overidentiﬁed analysis here, we attempt to mitigate this by multiplying
A by a scalar in order to match the variance of output innovations. Due to the
nonlinear maximization in estimating D, it is impractical to compute standard
error bands solely from bootstrap methods (see Sims and Zha (1999) for a related
discussion). In addition, the uncertainty induced by estimating (5.4) complicates
the error band calculations in ways beyond standard structural VAR analyses. We
defer a complete derivation and discussion of alternative error band calculations
for further research, as it is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we report
approximate two-standard error bands in Figure 4 that are computed using a
mixture of bootstrap and Bayesian Monte Carlo methods, the latter following
Sims and Zha (1999).13
12Our measure of ηfiscal is the diﬀerence between the government spending shock and the tax
shock, both estimated by Blanchard and Perotti (2001). When we estimate regression (5.8)
using the spending shock or the tax shock individually, the R2s are all below 6%.
13We use the following strategy to compute approximate standard errors for our overidentiﬁed
system. For each simulation j,t h eV A Rc o e ﬃcients and innovations are constructed using
standard bootstrap methods. Given a vector time series of innovations u
(j)







t where the measurement errors w
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t were drawn at random with






uη,(j). Following Sims and Zha (1999), we draw D(j) from a second-order Taylor
expansion of the posterior distribution for D (conditional on Σ−1
uη as well as Σu). This leads to
aM o n t eC a r l od r a wf o rA(j) = D(j)0Σ−1
uη,(j), and this is multiplied by a scalar in order to match
the variance of the simulated output innovations for draw j.T h es c a l e dA(j) is used to compute
the impulse responses for draw j. As a ﬁnal note, we employed no weighting scheme in drawing
21The results in Figure 4 are similar to the model-based one-at-a-time results in
Figure 3. The MRS shock continues to behave like the Galí IS shock, inducing
positive responses in output, inﬂation, real interest rates and the federal funds
rate. Again, the inﬂation response is not signiﬁcant. The MRS shock induces the
largest, most signiﬁcant, and most persistent response in all three yields. The
nominal yield level rises signiﬁcantly, due primarily to a signiﬁcant increase in
the level of real interest rates. However, the term premium responses are not
signiﬁcant.
For technology there is a signiﬁcantly positive response of the nominal yield
level after 3 quarters, due to an increase in real interest rate levels. This is
in contrast to the results for the technology shock taken alone, where the yield
response was insigniﬁcant. For monetary policy, the results are quite similar to
the results in section 5.2, when the model-based shock was viewed in isolation.
Finally, the ﬁscal shock again produces no signiﬁcant eﬀects on anything. This
result may suggests either that ﬁscal shocks have little impact on macroeconomic
or ﬁnancial variables. Alternatively, this measure of ﬁscal shocks may be ill-suited
for the exercises conducted in this paper.
5.5. Empirical results using model-based shocks in an exactly-identiﬁed
system
In order to get an unambiguous decomposition of variance, we estimate an exactly-
identiﬁed version of equation (5.7). We do so by assuming that D is lower
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 + w (5.10)
where use the notation ˜ εmrs, ˜ εtech, ˜ εfiscal and ˜ εmp for the true underlying shocks to
preferences, technology, ﬁscal policy, and monetary policy, respectively. We adopt
this ordering for the following reasons. First, monetary policy shocks have been
the most studied VAR shock in the literature. Evans and Marshall (1998) study
from the approximate posterior distribution for D. This method is asymptotically justiﬁed, but
computing error bands with more eﬃcient small-sample properties continues to be an area of
active research.
22how monetary policy shocks identiﬁed using diﬀerent methodologies (including
that described in section 5.1.3 for our ηmp measure) aﬀect interest rates. The
implications are robust across the diﬀerent identiﬁcations, suggesting that ηmp is
a fairly robust measure of this policy shock. In addition, ηmp has already been
regressed on several contemporaneous measures of real activity and prices, so it
is less likely to be contaminated with other shocks that move these variables. For
these reasons, ηmp is likely to be the cleanest measure in our ηt vector. Second,
Table 4 shows that the ﬁscal policy shock measure has the smallest correlation
with the VAR innovations ut of all of our ηt elements. Consequently, this row of
the matrix C is likely to be estimated imprecisely, so we wish to limit the inﬂuence
of the ﬁscal policy measures on the other analyses. Furthermore, Blanchard and
Perotti’s (2000) VAR analysis consists of a small three-variable VAR: it can be
argued that this shock is contaminated by innovations from omitted variables that
would be included in larger systems. These considerations motivate us to place
the ﬁscal policy measure last in the ordering. Finally, there is no obvious reason
for ordering the MRS shock ahead of the technology shock, so we will discuss the
robustness of our results when we switch the order of ηmrs and ηtech.
The results for ordering (5.10) are in Figure 5. The responses to the policy
shocks ˜ εmp and ˜ εfiscal are very similar to those found in section 5.2 for the raw
shocks ηmp and ηfiscal. In particular, a contractionary shock to monetary policy
induces a signiﬁcant decrease in output, a decrease in inﬂation that is largely
insigniﬁcant, an increase in the real rate, a signiﬁcant but short-lived increase in
the yield level and a marked ﬂattening of the yield slope. This response of the yield
slope to ˜ εmp is somewhat stronger than the response to ηmp f o u n di ns e c t i o n5 . 2 ,
lasting approximately one year. There are no signiﬁcant term premium responses
to ˜ εmp.T h e r e s p o n s e s t o ˜ εfiscal under identiﬁcation (5.10) are all insigniﬁcant.
While our placing the ﬁs c a ls h o c kf o u r t hi nt h eo r d e r i n gi n( 5 . 1 0 )w o u l dt e n dt o
render its eﬀects less pronounced, we found similar insigniﬁcance in the responses
to the raw ﬁscal shock ηfiscal, reported in section 5.2.
The responses to preference shock ˜ εmrs diﬀer somewhat from those to the raw
shock ηmrs. The responses of real GDP and inﬂation to ˜ εmrs appear much more
persistent than the corresponding responses to ηmrs. The inﬂation response is
larger and positive throughout. (The inﬂation response to ηmrs, described in in
section 5.2, ﬂuctuated closely around zero.) This inﬂation response corresponds
more closely to that of the aggregate demand shock discussed in section 4. The
federal funds and real rate responses look similar to those in section 5.2. The
response of the yield level is more pronounced in system (5.10) than in the exper-
23iments of section 5.2 because the inﬂation level is bigger and positive throughout.
Finally, the responses of the term premiums in this identiﬁcation are large and
signiﬁcant.
The identifying restrictions in (5.10) purge the technology shock of any linger-
ing eﬀects of the preference shock. While Table 3 shows that the unconditional
correlation between technology and preference shocks is small (around 5%), it
appears that the ordering used in (5.10) has a substantial eﬀect on the response
of output and inﬂation to the technology shock. First, output does not respond
initially to the technology impulse, but begins to rise after one year. This is
consistent with the empirical and theoretical analyses of Galí (1999), Basu, Fer-
nald, and Kimball (2000), and Francis and Ramey (2000). Galí (1999) and Basu,
Fernald and Kimball (2000) interpret this delay as evidence of inertial aggregate
demand due to price stickiness, while Francis and Ramey interpret the delay as
consistent with inertial aggregate demand due to habit persistence in consump-
tion and investment adjustment costs. Interestingly, when we reverse the order
of ηmrs and ηtech in equation (5.10) (as in section 5.6, below) we no longer get
this delayed output response. This suggests that the raw technology shock ηtech
may be contaminated with the eﬀect of the MRS shock. This contamination is
eliminated when the ordering in system (5.10) is used.
Second, one would expect that a positive technology shock should have a
substantial negative eﬀect on inﬂation. For example, in a model with monopolistic
competition, where prices are set as a mark-up over marginal cost, a technology
shock that reduced marginal costs would be deﬂationary. In sections 5.2 and
5.4, inﬂation does respond negatively to the technology shock, but the response
is weak and short-lived. In contrast, the response of inﬂation to ˜ εtech under
the lower-triangular identiﬁcation (5.10) is quite large (around 40 basis point
in response to a one-standard deviation ˜ εtech shock) and persists signiﬁcantly for
about two years. The real-rate response is smaller and shorter-lived, as in sections
5.2 and 5.4. The large size and persistence of the deﬂationary response, relative to
the real rate response, induces a large, signiﬁcant, and persistent decrease in the
yields of all three maturities. Note that the maximal responses of the three yields
are decreases of between 38 and 46 basis points. In addition, this measure of
the technology shock induces large and signiﬁcant declines in the term premiums
after three years. As a result of these eﬀects, the yield level drops substantially,
signiﬁcantly, and with great persistence. This identiﬁcation strategy is the only
one that implies an important level response for the yield curve in response to a
technology or aggregate supply shock. The responses of the yield slope and of
24the term premiums are insigniﬁcant.
5.6. Permuting the order of the preference and technology shocks
In system (5.10), we placed ηmrs second and ηtech third in the recursive ordering.
This is equivalent to assuming that ˜ εmrs may aﬀect ηtech but ˜ εtech does not aﬀect
ηmrs. We have performed the analysis with this ordering reversed. The qualitative
responses to the MRS shock are the same as in system (5.10). An impulse to
˜ εmrs signiﬁcantly increases both output and inﬂation, induces a signiﬁcant upward
shift in the level of the yield curve and in the 12- and 60-month term premiums.
However, the quantitative magnitudes of these eﬀects diﬀer from those in system
(5.10). In particular, the output eﬀect is smaller and less persistent, but the
inﬂation eﬀect is considerably larger.
In contrast, the eﬀect of ˜ εtech on interest rates becomes much less pronounced
when the ordering is reversed. The reason is that while the response of output
to ˜ εtech is considerably larger, the response of inﬂation is almost zero. Since the
signiﬁcant response of nominal yields to ˜ εtech in the (5.10) ordering is primarily
due to the large and signiﬁcant response of expected inﬂation, this attenuation
of the inﬂation response when the ordering is reversed eﬀectively eliminates any
signiﬁcant interest rate response. A possible explanation for this result is that our
model-based technology shock ηtech may be contaminated with the eﬀects of ˜ εmrs.
If so, this would tend to reduce the inﬂation response, since an expansionary
preference shock tends to move inﬂa t i o ni nad i r e c t i o no p p o s i t et ot h a to fa n
expansionary technology shock. In that case, ordering (5.10) would be preferable.
More generally, if one has a strong prior belief that technology shocks ought to
elicit a response in the inﬂation rate, this result would constitute evidence against
the (ηtech,ηmrs) ordering and in favor of the (ηmrs,ηtech) ordering (5.10).
6. Summary, discussion, and conclusion
When we look across the various empirical models used in this paper, several
results stand out. First, a shock that increases household’s preference for current
consumption, as opposed to current leisure or future consumption, seems to have
the biggest eﬀect on interest rates across all maturities. This shock seems to be
associated with the aggregate demand shock in the Galí model, in that both the
preference shock and the aggregate demand shock move output and inﬂation in
the same direction. Regardless of identiﬁcation strategy, this sort of shock induces
25a large, persistent, and statistically signiﬁcant shift in the level of the yield curve.
There are two ways of further analyzing this result. First, from a Fisherian
perspective, the nominal yield is the sum of the real yield and expected inﬂation
over the life of the bond. The preference/aggregate demand shock has a large
eﬀect on nominal interest rates because it moves real rates and expected inﬂation
i nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o n . T h et w oe ﬀects reinforce each other. These patterns are not
diﬃcult to reconcile with economic theory. An exogenous increase in household
preference for current consumption would cause households to want to borrow
from the future. Real interest rates must rise in order to enforce the constraint
that there be zero net borrowing in equilibrium. At the same time, an increase
in the relative utility of goods vs. leisure would tend to increase the equilibrium
quantity of labor supplied, raising the marginal product of capital. This, too,
would tend to raise the real rate. At the same time, an increased demand for goods
would increase ﬁrms’ marginal costs. In a model of monopolistic competition
where prices are set as a markup over marginal cost, this would increase inﬂation
(unless there is a compensating contraction in monetary policy).
A second way of analyzing this result is from the perspective of the expec-
tations hypothesis. The preference/aggregate demand shock is the only one to
consistently induce a signiﬁcant response in term premiums, deﬁned as the diﬀer-
ence between actual long yields and the yield predicted by the pure expectations
hypothesis. (Signiﬁcant term premium responses were also found for the tech-
nology shock in the identiﬁcation system of section 5.5 and the monetary policy
shock in section 5.2.) We ﬁnd that when the preference/aggregate demand-type
shock increases the short-term interest rate, it increases long-term interest rates
by about the same amount because it induces a rise in the term premiums. Since
term structure theory associates variation in term premiums with variation in the
market price of risk, this result suggests a deeper question: why would the price
of risk respond only to this particular macroeconomic impulse? In asset-pricing
models such as Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Wachter (2001), the main
reason for time-variation in the price of risk is business-cycle ﬂuctuation. In prin-
ciple, business cycles are driven by the entire vector of macroeconomic shocks.
Our result suggests that the price of risk responds diﬀerently depending on the
source of the business cycle impulse. In particular, a preference-driven recession
(e.g., in the language of the press, an exogenous decline in “consumer conﬁdence”)
would induce a bigger increase in household risk aversion than a technology-driven
recession. Why this should be is not at all clear, but it suggests a direction for
future research.
26A second result from our work concerns the type of macroeconomic shock that
moves output and inﬂation in opposite directions. Technology shocks and aggre-
gate supply shocks have this property. These sorts of shocks move real interest
rates and expected inﬂation in opposite directions, attenuating their impact on
nominal yields. The response of nominal interest rates to these shocks tends to
be weaker, and less signiﬁcant than the responses to the preference/aggregate de-
mand shocks. The direction of the interest rate response to technology/aggregate
supply shocks depends on whether the real rate response or the expected inﬂation
response dominates. We did not obtain robust results on this question. Thus,
whether this type of shock has a signiﬁcant impact on the yield curve is still an
open question, depending sensitively on the identiﬁcation strategy used.
Finally, the only shock that consistently shifts the slope of the yield curve is
the monetary policy shock. A contractionary shock induces a large, signiﬁcant,
but short-lived increase in the short-term real interest rate, with a much smaller
eﬀect on longer term real rates. This reduces the slope of the real yield curve.
At the same time, in three of our four exercises sections 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5), the
contractionary shock reduces the inﬂation slope. This is because the inﬂationary
response to the monetary contraction is sluggish, so the initial impact on long-
term expected inﬂation actually exceeds the impact on short-term inﬂation. The
combination of these two eﬀects induces a signiﬁcant reduction in the slope of the
nominal yield curve. However, the eﬀect dissipates in 6 months to one year.
Our results suggest speciﬁc macroeconomic impulses that may account for the
slope and level eﬀects identiﬁed as key drivers of the yield curve in empirical ﬁ-
nance research such as Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Knez, Litterman and
Scheinkman (1994), and Dai and Singleton (2000). In addition, they represent a
set of empirical patterns that dynamic equilibrium models ought to accommodate.
Finally, they motivate future research to help us understand how systematic mon-
etary policy interacts with fundamental shocks to induce movement in the nominal
yield curve.
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31Table 1: Decomposition of Variance under Recursive
Orthogonalization
Panel A: Decomposition of Variance of One-Month Yield
Steps ahead: 1-month 12-months 60-months
εY 0.014 (-0.01,0.042) 0.176 (0.042,0.311) 0.230 (0.011,0.448)
εPCOM 0.022 (-0.01,0.057) 0.329 (0.182,0.476) 0.488 (0.268,0.708)
εP 0.022 (-0.01,0.057) 0.008 (-0.02,0.039) 0.035 (-0.07,0.140)
εFF 0.168 (0.088,0.249) 0.209 (0.095,0.323) 0.106 (-0.00,0.214)
γ1 0.779 (0.702,0.856) 0.278 (0.192,0.364) 0.141 (0.052,0.231)
Panel B: Decomposition of Variance of 12-Month Yield
Steps ahead: 1-month 12-months 60-months
εY 0.048 (0.006,0.090) 0.192 (0.047,0.337) 0.243 (0.005,0.481)
εPCOM 0.031 (-0.00,0.069) 0.328 (0.168,0.488) 0.526 (0.280,0.771)
εP 0.004 (-0.01,0.020) 0.008 (-0.02,0.042) 0.032 (-0.04,0.114)
εFF 0.092 (0.033,0.151) 0.054 (-0.01,0.122) 0.032 (-0.04,0.114)
γ1 0.176 (0.074,0.277) 0.089 (0.027,0.151) 0.035 (-0.00,0.077)
γ2 0.649 (0.529,0.769) 0.329 (0.216,0.443) 0.129 (0.025,0.234)
Panel C: Decomposition of Variance of 60-Month Yield
Steps ahead: 1-month 12-months 60-months
εY 0.039 (0.00,0.081) 0.160 (0.023,0.298) 0.188 (-0.05,0.429)
εPCOM 0.040 (0.004,0.075) 0.305 (0.149,0.460) 0.584 (0.327,0.841)
εP 0.002 (-0.00,0.013) 0.016 (0.00,0.057) 0.068 (0.00,0.214)
εFF 0.027 (0.00,0.064) 0.010 (0.00,0.047) 0.019 (0.00,0.101)
γ1 0.069 (0.012,0.126) 0.039 (0.003,0.076) 0.011 (0.00,0.027)
γ2 0.518 (0.437,0.600) 0.296 (0.201,0.392) 0.082 (0.000,0.164)
γ3 0.305 (0.252,0.357) 0.174 (0.121,0.227) 0.048 (0.000,0.096)
Legend: εY,εPCOM,εP,a n dεFF denote the orthogonalized residuals to in-
dustrial production, commodity price index, the price level, and the federal funds
32rate. γj denotes the orthogonalized residual to the j-month yield. In the decom-
position used here, matrix d in equation (2.1) is lower triangular, so γ2 and γ3 do
not aﬀect the one-month yield, and γ3 does not aﬀect the 12-month yield. Num-
bers in parentheses are upper and lower two-standard deviation bounds, computed
using 200 Monte Carlo draws with bootstrapped residuals.
33Figure 2: Weights Used to Construct Yield Curve Level, Slope, and
Curvature
One-month yield 12-month yield 60-month yield
Level 0.5709 0.6764 0.4653
Slope -0.6019 -0.0408 0.7976
Curvature 0.5585 -0.7354 0.3839
Legend: The time series for the vector process consisting of the one-, 12-, and
60-month zero coupon yields are decomposed into 3 principal components. The
level, slope, and curvature of the yield curve are identiﬁed as the ﬁrst, second, and
third principal components, respectively. The weights reported in this table for
level, slope, and curvature are the eigenvectors associated with the largest, second
largest, and smallest eigenvalues of the moment matrix of the vector of yields.




ηmp ηmrs ηtech ηfiscal
ηmp 1.0
ηmrs 0.11 1.0
ηtech -0.11 0.05 1.0
ηfiscal -0.02 0.15 0.31 1.0
Legend: The model-based shocks to monetary policy, preferences, technol-
ogy, and ﬁscal policy are denoted ηmp, ηmrs, ηtech, and ηfiscal, respectively. The
derivation of these shocks is described in section 5.






35Figure 1: Recursive Orthogonalization


































































































































































0.12Figure 2: Gali Model


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































0.18Figure 3: Responses to Individual Model-Based Shocks
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0.36Figure 4: Over-Identified VAR: Diagonal D Matrix
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0.08Figure 5: Exactly Identified VAR: Lower-Triangular D Matrix
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